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Introduction
I would like to discuss in this article the following two points with regard to
the legacy of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident; the historical significance of the Gulf
of Tonkin Incident and Vietnamese civilian suffering in the Vietnam War. First, It
is now clear that the justification given by the Johnson administration at that time
of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was inaccurate and that the public was
manipulated. In this sense, the incident reminds us of the following classic
quotation by Aeschylus, an ancient Greek tragic dramatist (525 B.C.-456 B.C.):
“In war, truth is the first casualty.” The Gulf of Tonkin Incident could also be
considered as a turning point for the U.S. move toward an open-ended military
commitment in Vietnam. Secondly, I will touch upon Vietnamese civilian
suffering as a consequence of this open-ended military commitment.
I: Historical Significance of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
1･1. The Justification by the Johnson administration
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred on August 2, 1964, when the USS
Maddox was attacked by three Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin
off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). We now know that
the August 2 attack had been ordered by a Vietnamese locally based commander,
and not one from Hanoi.
2
Johnson did not order any retaliation in response to this
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2. Robert S. McNamara, et. al. Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the
Vietnam Tragedy, (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 202.
first attack, but the Maddox continued to resume patrols the next day, August 3,
with another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy joining. On the night of August 4,
the crews of the two destroyers reported to Washington that they were under
attack again. The Johnson administration portrayed these two attacks as
“unprovoked” and, immediately after the alleged second attack, authorized a
single retaliatory measure of sixty-four sorties against North Vietnamese patrol
boat bases and a nearby supporting oil complex.
At the time of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the presidential election campaign
of 1964 was in a crucial stage, for Johnson was opposing the hawkish Republican
candidate Barry Goldwater. Johnson swiftly decided to retaliate against the DRV
to show the public his toughness and to portray his opponent as weak.
President Johnson seized this opportunity as a pretext to seek a congressional
resolution (the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) approving the use of force in
Southeast Asia. This authorized the president to “take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression.”
3
Since the legislators believed the alleged second attack from
the DRV to be “unprovoked,” they passed, on August 7, the proposed resolution
with unanimous approval in the House and with only two senators, Wayne Morse
from Oregon and Ernest Gruening from Alaska, dissenting. It amounted to a
blank check for the president to initiate an open-ended American military action
in Vietnam.
1･2. The Johnson Administration’s Deception of Congress and the American
People
This year, the 50th anniversary of the incident, we know that recently
declassified documents confirm the findings of historical studies that the
justification for the retaliatory attack by the Johnson administration was
inaccurate as well as misleading.
4
I would like to put forward the following two
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facts: firstly, the U.S. controlled naval raids against the DRV by South Vietnam
before the Gulf of Tonkin Incident; secondly, it is now clear that the second
attack never took place. In discussing these two points, I mainly rely on the
essays written by John Prados, now a senior fellow at the National Security
Archive, an independent non-governmental research institute in Washington, D.
C..
5
Johnson claimed that the U.S. had done nothing to provoke the DRV. At a
congressional executive session on August 6, Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara maintained; “Our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not
associated with, [and] was not aware of, any South Vietnamese actions.”
6
We
know from the Pentagon Papers that the Maddox was in charge of electronic
espionage in the Gulf of Tonkin (the so-called “DeSoto Patrol”), and one of the
objectives was to review the reaction of the DRV’s radars to the OPLAN 34-A
covert command attacks against the DRV carried out by South Vietnamese naval
gunboats, but controlled by the U. S.
7
It is now clear from the recently
declassified White House tapes that Johnson and McNamara were well aware of
the fact that a series of raids had been carried out on North Vietnamese coastal
targets, the two offshore islands, Hon Me and Hon Ngu, and that there were
connections between the OPLAN 34-A raids and the destroyer’ s “DeSoto
Patrol,” intelligence mission. For example, in a telephone conversation with
Johnson at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, one day after the first attack by Vietnamese
torpedo boats, McNamara explained to Johnson about the OPLAN 34-A covert
operations:
Secretary McNamara: Right. And we’re going to, and I think I should also, or we
should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert
operations. There’s no question but what that had bearing on. And on Friday night,
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as you probably know, we had four TP [McNamara means PT] boats from Vietnam
manned by Vietnamese or other nationals, attack two islands. And we expended,
oh, a thousand rounds of ammunition of one kind or another against them. We
probably shot up a radar station and a few other miscellaneous buildings. And
following twenty-four hours after that, with this destroyer in that same area,
undoubtedly led them to connect the two events.
8
Vo Nguyen Giap, the former Vietnamese defense minister, informed
McNamara, at the retrospective conference in Hanoi in November 1996 that there
had been no attack on August. 4.
9
Among newly released documents regarding
the uncertainty of the second attack are those declassified by the National Security
Agency (NSA) on December 1, 2005, which revealed that NSA officials
provided the leaders in the Johnson administration only with information
supporting the claims that the second attack had occurred. According to a NSA
historian Robert J. Hanyok, who wrote an article in Cryptologic Quarterly, an
internal publication, in early 2001, “The overwhelming body of reports, if used,
would have told the story that no attack occurred.”
10
Johnson and McNamara
considered these NSA reports as vital evidence of the second attack and used it as
a pretext to support retaliatory air strikes and to get a Congressional resolution to
give the president freedom of action in Vietnam.
Based on these two reasons, it is important to note that at the time of the Gulf
of Tonkin Incident, Johnson and McNamara manipulated and deceived Congress
as well as the American people.
II: The American Way of War in Vietnam
2･1. U.S. Direct Military Commitment in Vietnam
President Johnson had been reluctant to escalate the war until after the
Presidential election in November 1964 to maximize the chance of realizing his
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Great Society programs, including promoting civil rights. However, his decision
at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident paved the way for a far heavier price to
be paid than the administration had anticipated. Given the growing deterioration
of the situation into South Vietnam, in March 1965, the Johnson administration
started resuming regular bombing of North Vietnam as well as sending the first
American combat troops into South Vietnam. By July 1965, the war in Vietnam
had turned into an “American War.” The U.S. also had resumed sustained
bombing campaigns in both North and South Vietnam and had initiated “Search
and Destroy” missions in the South. At peak strength, about 543, 400 U.S.
military personnel were deployed in South Vietnam.
11
Regarding the sustained bombing, Vietnam ended up the most bombed
country in world history. The air campaigns against Vietnam were based on the
idea of “strategic bombing” from the Second World War and the Korean War.
Between 1965 and 1972, the total amount of explosives dropped on Vietnam was
about four and a half million tons; around three and a half million tons in the
South and about one million tons in the North.
2･2. “Search and Destroy” Missions and the Dilemma of American Military
Strategy
“Search and Destroy” missions aimed to suppress national liberation
movements in South Vietnam by conducting ground operations with gradually
escalationg numbers of American combat troops. The major objective was to
locate and eliminate the National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese regular
units. “Search and Destroy” missions relied on America’s advanced technology
and vast material resources.
In the war without fronts in South Vietnam, it was very hard for American
soldiers to distinguish combatants and non-combatants. Under these
circumstances, mass civilian killings and discriminatory bombings became
common in American military operations. As a retired U.S. Army Colonel
Herbert Y. Schandler suggested, “The supreme paradox of the Vietnam War, for
those Americans who fought in the jungle of Vietnam, was that the American
strategy for winning the war led to disdain for the South Vietnamese people
themselves, on whose behalf the United States had ostensibly intervened in the
first place. Thus did an insoluble contradiction exist between the overriding U.S.
political objectives of the war and the actual situation on the ground in
Vietnam.”
12
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III: Vietnamese Civilian Suffering in the American War in Vietnam―The
My Lai (Son My) Massacre in March, 1968 and “Many My Lais”―
On March 16, 1968, one U.S. Army infantry company killed 504 innocent
civilians (among them, about seventy percent of these people were women and
children) in the sub-hamlets of My Lai 4, in Son My village, Quang Ngai
Province. The My Lai (Son My) Massacre was one of the largest single
American war atrocities and was the only one which was made public in the U.S.
in November 1969, about one and a half years after the incident.
13
When over
one hundred Vietnam veterans testified before the Winter Soldiers Investigation,
sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans against the War (VVAW) in early 1971, they
claimed that such war atrocities as the My Lai Massacre were the consequences of
American conduct in Vietnam.
14
After the revelation of the massacre, President
Nixon said, at a news conference on December 8, 1969. that My Lai was an
“isolated incident.”
15
Regarding American war atrocities in Vietnam, it is worth noting that in
August 2006 the Los Angeles Times published a series of articles
16
based on
official government documents from the “Vietnam War Crimes Working Group”
archive.
17
These articles were written by Deborah Nelson, then a staff writer at
the Washington bureau of the Los Angeles Times, and Nick Turse, a freelance
journalist. The documents (9,000 pages long) were assembled by a Pentagon task
force just after the revelation of the My Lai Massacre and were declassified in
1994.
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Although the documents had been unnoticed for a while, Turse, then a
graduate student at Columbia University, discovered them. The documents detail
320 alleged incidents that were substantiated by Army investigators. We now
know that, as Nelson and Turse point out in the Los Angeles Times articles, the
documents “confirmed atrocities by U.S. forces in Vietnam were more extensive
than was previously shown.”
18
IV: The Legacy of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
As mentioned in this article, the decision of the Johnson administration to
launch a single retaliatory attack against the DRV and to get absolute presidential
power to wage the war was a starting point for an open-ended American military
commitment in Vietnam.
In conclusion, two significant points concerning the legacy of the Gulf of
Tonkin Incident are worth noting, First, the flawed intelligence and manipulation
of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident bear a similarity to the manner of how the G. W.
Bush administration at the time of the war in Iraq manipulated intelligence to
make the public believe that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.
Second, the open-ended American military commitment in Vietnam resulted
in large Vietnamese civilian casualties. According to an estimate of the
Vietnamese government made public in April 1995, twenty years after the end of
the Vietnam War, more than three million Vietnamese, including two million
civilians died in the conflict.
19
The Vietnamese government also announced that
5.3 million Vietnamese civilians were wounded.
20
Regarding the scale of casualties, as freelance journalist Nick Turse points out
in the last chapter of his recent book, in “America’ s preferred postwar
narrative…many would like to forget, and so many others refuse to remember”
the reality of the Vietnam War, especially the suffering of the Vietnamese
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civilians.
21
He changed one of Peter Seeger’s famous songs, “Where have all the
flower gone?” to “Where have all the war crimes gone?” as the title of the last
chapter of his book. One recent example of “America’s preferred narratives,” in
the words of Turse, is a 13-year long program (2012-2025) to commemorate the
50th anniversary of the ending of the Vietnam War, which President Obama
announced on May 25, 2012. The main objective of this program is “to pay
tribute to more than three million servicemen and women who left their families
bravely” for Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.”
22
In the Commemoration of
the 50th Anniversary of the Vietnam War, beginning on Memorial Day (May 28,
2012), and continuing through to Veterans Day (November 11, 2025), the
American federal government will try to partner with State and local
governments, veterans organizations, and other private organizations to develop
various programs to honor “our Vietnam veterans, our fallen, our wounded, those
unaccounted for, their families….”
23
By August 24, 2014, 904 events have been
conducted and the total number of partners for the commemoration was 6256.
24
For this commemoration, nothing has been mentioned about the far greater
Vietnamese civilian suffering.
As the American government wages a perpetual war in Afghanistan and has
been forced to respond to unstable situations in Iraq and Syria, it has been crucial
for the administration of Barack Obama to emphasize the bravery and sacrifice of
ordinary soldiers as well as to underscore the individual sacrifices of ordinary
American people. Within this tendency to glorify the war in Vietnam initiated by
the current administration, the bitter legacy of the Vietnam War is now being
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transformed into “a celebratory story of American heroism in its intent and its
conduct.”
25
Therefore, it is still an unfinished journey for American leaders as well as
ordinary American citizens to overcome their ethnocentrism and to come to terms
with the reality of the far greater suffering of Vietnamese civilians. In this sense,
at the time of its 50th anniversary, it is still worthwhile reflecting on the legacy of
the Gulf of Tonkin Incident of 1964.
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